Differences in underemployment between the United States and the Netherlands by Dijk, Jouke van
  
 University of Groningen
Differences in underemployment between the United States and the Netherlands
Dijk, Jouke van
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1998
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Dijk, J. V. (1998). Differences in underemployment between the United States and the Netherlands. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
     Jouke van Dijk is Associate Professor, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen,*
The Netherlands. Hendrik Folmer is Professor at the Agricultural University, Wageningen and
CenTER Tilburg University, The Netherlands. Henry Herzog and Alan Schlottmann are
Professors, Department of Economics, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA. Address
for correspondence: J. van Dijk, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, P.O. Box
800, NL-9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands. Phone: +31 50 3633896   Fax: +31 50
3633901   E-mail: j.van.dijk@frw.rug.nl   
Differences in underemployment between
the United States and The Netherlands
Jouke van Dijk
Hendrik Folmer
Henry W. Herzog, Jr.
Alan M. Schlottmann*
SOM theme D: Demography and geography
Abstract
In this paper the method of cross nation comparison has been applied to analyze wage
impacts of labor market institutions. The countries under comparison are the US and
the Netherlands. By means of stochastic wage frontier models it has been shown that
labor market institutions, in particular, higher unemployment benefits and collective
bargaining lead to substantial less underemployment in the Netherlands than in the
US. Information channels also play a role, especially in the US, although to a smaller
extent.
     For excellent reviews of earnings studies, see Ehrenberg and Smith (1991), Chapters 8, 9, and1
11, and Polachek and Siebert (1993). In addition, see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a
comprehensive review of empirical job search literature.
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I.  Introduction
Studies of wage determination often attribute variation in labor market outcomes to
differences in labor market institutions. Important institutions are information
channels, social security, rules with respect to the obligation to accept a job offer,
collective bargaining and the role of trade unions. The impact of the labor market
institutions should vary (like earnings) across workers by human capital endowments,
across regions by labor market conditions, and across and between occupations.  For1
instance, it has been argued that professional, white collar, blue collar and service
workers employ quite different job search strategies, and that search outcomes (jobs
and earnings) likely vary by quantity and quality of labor market information utilized
in the process. In a similar manner, variations among workers in the attainment of
potential (maximum attainable) earnings % the downside of which results in job
"mismatches" and underemployment % can be attributed to institutions. Such
institutions, and in turn the level of underemployment, vary considerably among
countries, and reflect in part important differences in the role, and level of effort, of
national governments in matching workers with job opportunities and providing
social security.
In this study we consider and examine this contention by measuring the
impacts of labor market institutions within the Netherlands and the United States.
These countries have been chosen because of the substantial differences between them
and the availability of comparable datasets. In this respect, differences among
countries in labor market institutions have received little attention within the labor
literature, particularly with regard to underemployment. This neglect is related in
part to the difficulty of measuring public policy impacts within a national setting. In
particular, empirical evidence in this area can only be obtained infrequently when
institutional changes occur. Moreover, adjustments to institutional change often take
place with considerable time lags--such that resulting behavioral effects are difficult
     Methodological issues associated with this approach are examined in Folmer and Nijkamp (1985)2
and Folmer (1986).
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to disentangle from other changing conditions.
However, institutional linkages to underemployment can be (also) examined by
means of cross-nation comparisons of labor market systems.  The purpose of this2
study is to utilize this approach to investigate the impacts of labor market institutions
on underemployment, inferences being drawn from experience in the Netherlands
and the United States. A brief overview of labor market institutions in the two
countries is presented in the following section, along with a general discussion of
each country's public employment service. Next, a formal model of job search is
developed in Section III, where differential institutions are shown to impact
reservation wages and, in turn, the degree of underemployment. The method by
which underemployment is obtained from earnings "frontiers" is also discussed.
Separate econometric estimates of these frontiers for the Netherlands and the United
States, in both the aggregate and for major occupational groups, are presented and
compared in Section IV. Conclusions are presented in a final section.
II.  Labor market institutions
The most important labor market institutions which impact underemployment are:
(I) information channels and job search costs
(II) unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
(III) collective bargaining and the role of trade unions
Below these institutions will be briefly discussed. Because the empirical analysis in
section IV makes use of data for the period 1980 - 1985 we will describe the
institutions in this period.
In the United States, the role of family, friends, and relatives in providing
labor market information on employment opportunities and associated job
characteristics has often been emphasized. Such information networks have been
cited as particularly important for blue collar and service workers. For example,
Lansing and Mueller (1967) documented the importance of such information sources
for search within both national labor markets and economically depressed areas. The
     This may be attributed, in part, to the ever changing demands placed upon the service.  In this3
regard, see Levitan, Mangum and Marshall (1976), Chapter 14. In addition, see Cassell (1968).
     See U.S. Department of Labor (1983), Table 34.  Since the average number of job search4
methods used was 1.63, percentages such as these will add to more than 100 percent.
     After this period the local public employment services in the US have invested in5
computersystems to maintain their data banks on amore systematic basis. This has considerably
helped the matching process in the US, but is not relevant for our empirical analysis for which
data from the period 1980 - 1985 are used. Another factor which has improved the matching
process on the US labor market in recent years has been the significant growth in private sector
employment services that specialize in temporary and part-time positions. Some people have
made these type of positions into a type of full-time work. Finally, the growth of the U.S.
economy in recent years has certainly helped workers match to jobs.  
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dominance of personal information networks also appears in early case studies of
(unemployed) workers, such as Lurie and Rayack (1966) and Sheppard & Belitsky
(1965).
A nationwide public employment service was established in the United States
in the 1930's, prompted initially by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 and subsequently
by Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935. The U.S. Employment Service is
administered at the state level, and federally funded through unemployment insurance
taxes. Early case studies such as Wilcock and Franke (1963) attribute only modest
success to this organization in disseminating employment information.  Studies for3
the eighties indicate that neither potential employees nor employers appear to rely
upon the Service as their primary source of labor market information. For example,
only 24 percent of unemployed jobs seekers in 1982 utilized public employment
services while 78 percent searched using "employer directed" methods.  Data for4
1990 reported by Layard et al (1991, p. 239-240) are very much in line with these
percentages and confirm the greater importance of direct employer contacts in the
US and the relative unimportance of public employment agencies.5
The reliance of blue collar job-seekers on information provided by friends
and relatives on the one hand, and upon employer-directed information (often at the
plant gate) on the other, is indicative of a more limited search network than that
utilized by white collar workers, and particularly by individuals with professional
and technical occupations [Swigart (1984)]. For the latter, the utilization of local and
national newspaper and magazine advertisements, professional organizations, and
private employment agencies both broadens the search process and limits the
importance of the public employment service. Studies of white collar workers in
5other countries, such as Fineman (1983) in Britain, also suggest a reliance on
expanded information sources. In this regard, training studies for upgrading blue
collar and service workers recognize the need for expanded job search [Brecher
(1972)].
The functioning of the U.S. Employment Service in the period 1980 - 1985
stands in contrast to its counterpart in the Netherlands, particularly for blue collar
and service workers. Within the Netherlands, and in other countries such as Sweden,
data-processing equipment is utilized at local employment offices for computerized
job-matching. Local databases are interconnected with one another, thus making it
possible to obtain information in each Public Employment Service (PES) concerning
vacancies and unemployed individuals elsewhere. Several studies document the
importance of the PES in job search. For instance, Heijke (1986) reports that 37
percent of those searching for employment utilized the PES as their primary
information source while only 7 percent relied on friends and relatives to provide
employment information. The importance of the PES in the Netherlands is also
reported in a recent report of the European Commission (EC, 1994). Of the
unemployed 63% rely on the PES as their main instrument of job search. Private
employment services and direct application to employers and advertisements are the
main method of job search for about 12% of the unemployed. Friends and relatives
are of limited importance.
It should be noted that benefit entitlement in the Netherlands requires the
unemployed to register at the PES, and to accept a job offer that matches individual
qualifications. However, there is no requirement that an individual accept a job offer
that does not match his or her job qualifications, or that requires relocation. Because
most of the unemployed are obliged to register, information maintained by the PES
on these individuals is rather complete and up-to-date.
The opposite is true for information concerning vacancies since employers
are not required to notify the PES of their employment needs. However, because
employers must obtain the agency's permission to discharge workers, and thus must
maintain satisfactory relations with this body, vacancies for lower skilled workers are
often posted with the PES.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that employers prefer to fill vacancies for
higher skilled workers through information channels maintained outside the PES,
6such as informal networks to include friends and relatives as well as formal channels
utilizing both local and national newspaper and magazine advertisements. The
following provides at least partial support for this circumvention of the PES,
particularly in filling vacancies for higher skilled workers. Employers have a natural
tendency to prefer the employed and recent school graduates to the unemployed
because the latter are assumed to be less qualified. This applies in particular to the
medium and long-term unemployed, a group that is strongly overrepresented among
individuals registered at the PES [Folmer and Van Dijk (1988)]. Because employed
workers and recent school graduates usually do not initially register at the PES,
employers tend to exploit the personal and formal recruitment channels maintained
outside the PES. However, the PES is also exploited in addition to other personal and
formal recruitment channels.
The results of a survey of employers by Gaspersz and Van Voorden (1987)
indicate that personnel with lower qualifications are primarily recruited by means of
the PES (80%), on the internal labor market (75%) and by employment agencies
(66%). Personnel with middle-level qualifications are recruited for the most part via
advertisements in national newspapers and magazines (83%) or internally (75%),
while professional and technical workers are almost always recruited through
national newspapers and magazines (90%). Furthermore, Gaspersz and Van Voorden
(1987) report that employers utilize on average 2.8 recruitment channels.
In summary, for lower skilled workers and their job vacancies, the PES is
an important source of information, even in cases where reemployment is ultimately
finalized on the basis of other information. For higher skilled jobs, both job-seekers
and employers rely on information provided in national newspapers and magazines,
a situation not unlike that in the United States. Thus, for jobs at all occupational
levels there exists a well organized information system in the Netherlands.
It should be observed that the PES in the Netherlands is not only directly
instrumental with respect to job matching in the sense that it provides job searchers
with information on job openings and employers with information on potential
workers, but also indirectly in the sense that it provides labor market information in
general. Moreover, it is often instrumental with respect to training, application
techniques, etc. (Bajema, 1993).
The observations above are supported by information in the upper portion
     The comparison is biased because the unemployment rate in the Netherlands was higher than in6
the United States. However, the difference in unemployment rates does not fully account for the
differences observed.
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of Table 1 indicative of public employment effort in the two countries . For instance,6
both relative expenditures on employment and training services and employment
within benefit administration in the Netherlands exceed comparable figures for the
United States.
Turning now to unemployment insurance (UI), selected characteristics of the
benefit systems in the Netherlands and the United States are shown in the middle
panel of Table 1. In this regard, the institutional underpinnings of the two systems
are similar with respect to eligibility, benefit determination, and taxation. However,
both the duration of UI benefits and their relative magnitude in terms of the average
replacement rate (benefits/past earnings) are significantly higher in the Netherlands
than in the United States. As will be discussed in Section III, such UI benefits reduce
the opportunity cost of unemployment and job search, and thus augment the effects
of better labor market information by raising observed wages (relative to potential
wages) and reducing underemployment.
The next institutional aspects to be addressed are the role of trade unions and
collective bargaining. Some differences between the U.S. and the Netherlands are
presented in Table 1. Trade union density in the Netherlands is substantially higher
than in the U.S. This also holds for collective bargaining. Moreover, in the
Netherlands bargaining is predominantly sectoral; in the U.S. it takes place
predominantly at company or even plant level. Finally the index for labor standards
defined as the rules and regulations that govern working conditions including such
issues as working time, employment stability, workers' representation rights and
minimum wages is substantially higher in the Netherlands than in the U.S. The
8Table 1. Public Employment Service, Unemployment Insurance:
Selected Characteristics
Characteristic Netherlands United States
Public Employment Servicea
Labor Market Training as Percent of GDP 0.22 0.10
Public spending on active Programs
Expenditures as Percent of GDP 1.07 0.25
Employees in Unemployment Benefit




Maximum Benefit Duration 36 months 12 monthsd
Subject to Income Tax Yes Yes
Initial Relation to Earnings Proportional Proportional
Initial Gross Replacement Rate (percent at
Average Production Earnings (1988) 70 50
Wage Bargaining
Trade Union density 26 16e
Collective bargaining 71 18e
Predominant bargaining level Sectoral Company
plantf
Economy wide bargaining coordination limited lacking
Indices for labor standards  (synthetic index) 5 0g
  See OECD (1991), Table 7.12 and OECD (1992), Table 2.15 and Table 2.16.a
  Authors' estimate from Appendix 2, OECD (1992) and national unemployment benefits personnelb
reported by U.S. Employment Service.
  See OECD (1991), Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.c
  Basic coverage is 26 weeks, current extension is for 52 weeks.d
  OECD, 1994, p.173e
  OECD, 1994, p.175f
  OECD, 1994, p.154. The synthetic index for the stringency of regulations on labor standards covers:g
fixed terms contracts, employment protection, minimum wages and employees representation rights.
The highest scores are 7-8 meaning strong government regulation for, for instance, Sweden.
9above differences are expected to lead to larger variation in wages in the US than in
the Netherlands.
Based upon these differences in labor market institutions operative within the
Netherlands and the United States (reflected by job search information and cost), two
hypotheses can now be developed concerning the magnitude of underemployment in
the two countries. First, within wage (earnings) regimes undifferentiated by
occupation, measured underemployment will be significantly less in the Netherlands
than in the United States. Such an expectation derives from the quality of the job-
matching (information) program, higher relative UI benefits and minimum wages,
trade union density and collective bargaining in the former country. Second, among
occupational groups differences in underemployment are expected both within and
between the two countries. 
Blue collar workers are expected to be most underemployed in both countries
because of the relative large heterogeneity of this category. It is made up of manual
workers and includes both skilled and unskilled workers. All the institutions
mentioned above contribute to the gap between the U.S. and the Netherlands, in
particular the availability and use of information channels.
Professional and technical workers are highly specialized. In both countries
this category is expected to have a higher W/W* ratio than blue collar workers
because of better job search skills as a consequence of higher education. As indicated
above, professional and technical workers in the US and the Netherlands employ
similar labor market information channels. As shown in Table 1, the major
differences between the U.S. and the Netherlands derive primarily from maximum
benefit duration and the initial gross replacement rate. These differences provide a
lower cost of job search in the Netherlands and thus a lower likelihood of a job
mismatch.
The category other white collar workers in the Netherlands is strongly
dominated by public sector workers. Wage differentiation is rather limited for these
workers. Hence, this category is expected to have the highest W/W* ratio both
within the Netherlands and compared to the U.S. These hypotheses are investigated
below within a formal model of job search, and by an econometric technique
explicitly designed to measure potential earnings, and thus underemployment.




C(Wr) ' c % Wr & R & UI.
     Here we abstract from the excellent literature survey of Mortensen (1986) and, to a lesser extent,7
the reviews by Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Lippman and McCall (1976). In these surveys,
prospective employers differentially evaluate a given seacher's (invariant) job skills;
consequently, potential employers tender different offers, W , to the searcher according to theo
wage distribution F(W ).o
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III. Labor market institutions
and underemployment
A. The Job Search Model
Workers in this study are assumed to obtain observed wages, W, through optimal
search activity.  Time is represented by a sequence of discrete periods of fixed7
length. The number of random wage offers "drawn" from the wage distribution
F(W ) per unit time is assumed to follow the Poisson distribution, with parameter 8o
representing the "offer arrival rate." In addition, 8 as well as parameters of F(W )o
are assumed to be known by searchers and unchanging over time. Finally, although
workers may choose among offers received during the current time period, they are
prohibited from "recalling" offers extended during previous periods.
Given F(W ), 8, interest rate *, and an offer equal to W , the marginalo r
benefit to continued search can be represented as 
(1)
B(!) being convex, nonnegative, and strictly decreasing in W . Hereafter, W  isr r
termed the "reservation wage," the optimal value of which is chosen to equate the
marginal cost of continued search with B(W ). Given an offer equal to W , ther r
marginal cost of continued search this period can be defined as 
(2)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents out-of-pocket cost
while the latter three terms define the opportunity cost of continued search, each
     In this model, labor market information is imperfect in the sense that, while the individual knows8
the parameters of F(W ) as well as 8 (see above), he or she does not know which offers will beo
extended by specific firms.
     See Ehrenberg and Smith (1991), pp. 607-614.9
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expressed per unit of time. In the latter regard, one relinquishes W  by continuedr
search, an amount reduced somewhat by the value one places on "leisure," R, and by
unemployment insurance, UI, as well. In the case of employed U.I. is the present
wage whereas R is not relevant.
As stated, the optimal reservation wage is determined by the searcher to
equate the marginal benefits and costs of continued search in equations (1) and (2),
respectively. This also implies that the "optimal stopping rule" is to accept any offer
that either equals or exceeds the reservation wage implied by Br(W ) = Cr(W ). Suchr r
a determination is illustrated in Figure 1 for a specific individual with (initial)
marginal benefit and cost curves B  and C , respectively. Based upon these two1 1
curves, search should terminate when an offer, W , either equals or exceeds Wr .o r
Figure 1 may be employed to illustrate several other important points
regarding job search. First, for each worker, there exists a "potential" or maximum
attainable wage offer (W* in Figure 1) commensurate with his or her job skills.
However, with Br(W ) < 0 and Cr(W ) > 0 in equations (1) and (2) respectively,r r
and B(W*) . 0, then Wr < W*. Thus, virtually all individuals are underemployedr
once they find a job, and the magnitude of such underemployment is related both to
labor market information and to search costs. In this regard, better labor market
information and/or lower search costs would improve the job-matching process, a
topic that we address below.  Second, E (W) $ Wr in Figure 1 due to the optimal8 r
stopping rule. Finally, even though "like" individuals will have equivalent Wr andr
W* in Figure 1, their actual (observed) wages obtained during search (Wr # W <r
W*) will likely differ due to the stochastic nature of the search process.9
In Section II, considerable differences were noted between the Netherlands
and the United States in labor market institutions. We are now in a position to





    Figure 1. Marginal benefits (B) and Cost (C) of continued
job search and the determination of
optimal reservation wages (W )r
     Notice that an increase in the offer arrival rate, 8, in no way affects W* in Figure 1, the10
maximum attainable wage instead being determined by the upper tail of the offer distribution
F(W ), which is invariant.  For an examination of how the optimal reservation wage wouldo
change (up or down) commensurate with changes in the mean and/or variance of F(W ), seeo
Mortensen (1986).
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observed wages. For the individual depicted in Figure 1, better labor market information
likely: (1) increases the rate at which offers are extended [8 in equation (1)]; and (2) decreases
out-of-pocket search costs [c in equation (2)]. 
Marginal benefit and cost curves shift to B  and C  respectively in Figure 1, and the2 2
optimal reservation wage is increased from Wr to W".  In this regard, underemployment isr r 10
reduced to the extent that the optimal reservation wage, and in turn the observed wage, are
increased relative to the potential wage, W*. Higher UI benefits (per unit time) reinforce the
information effects above by reducing the opportunity cost of continued search in equation
(2), and thus by shifting the marginal cost curve in Figure 1 downward from C  to C .2 3
Consequently, the optimal reservation wage is increased to Wr", and underemployment isr
further reduced in that the observed wage [E(W) $ Wr"] is increased relative to W*. r
Collective bargaining has no direct impact on the marginal benefits and costs of
search. Rather it influences the setting in which search takes place. Since collective bargaining
in the Netherlands takes place at the sectoral level, an individual's wage range is more or less
fixed once he/she has received and accepted a wage offer. In the U.S. on the other hand
collective bargaining generally takes place at either the company or plant level. This means
that there likely exists a much larger variety in terms of wages for individuals with the same
labor market characteristics.
In what follows, it is convenient to base comparisons of national labor market
efficiency (job matching) upon the ratio W/W* rather than upon the difference W* - W. Such
a comparison, of course, must be "ceteris paribus," and it is to that issue that we now turn.
Based upon the above discussion, observed wages of individuals, W, are obtained
as accepted offers from the distribution F(W ), and thus are determined by arguments of theo
latter. In this regard, observed wages are dependent upon: (1) a group of personal attributes
("inputs") traditionally assumed to augment human capital stock, H; (2) job characteristics,
J; and (3) regional labor market conditions, R. Inputs in H include education and work
experience, while job characteristics, J, relate to duties performed (often proxied by industry
of employment). However, given F(W ) and the optimal stopping rule, W is also related too
the underlying determinants of job search information and cost in equations (1) and (2).
Although such information and cost likely depend upon H, J and R above (for instance,
information is likely to increase with H), both information and search cost will systematically
vary between the two countries based upon differential labor markets institutions.
     Hofler and Murphy (1992) interpret W/W* as an index of "underpayment," and demonstrate11
how such underpayment varies with labor market information.
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B. Measuring Underemployment
With the above in mind,
W = W (H, J, R) (3)
will be estimated for each country, with major occupational groups represented
initially by binary independent variables, and subsequently by individual equations.
Also, the "potential" or maximum attainable wage for each worker, W*, is solely a
function of the offer distribution, F(W ), and thus of its determinants H, J, and Ro
above. Consequently, for each individual characterized by H, J, and R, W* = max
[W (H, J, R)] > W.
The degree of underemployment varies inversely with W/W*, and for any
group of individuals, with E(W/W*).  Thus, measuring underemployment requires11
that a potential wage, W*, be determined and compared with the observed wage, W,
for each individual within our research population (described below). In addition,
such a determination must be "ceteris paribus" in terms of the inclusion of
independent variables for the estimation of equation (3), as well as the disaggregation
of the analysis to accommodate unmeasurable institutional attributes of job search
information and cost that vary across countries and occupations. Finally, based upon
the job search model outlined above, our estimating equation must explicitly reflect
a stochastic wage with a two-sided distribution as well as a separate
underemployment term (W* - W) which is nonnegative.
Such a model (wage equation) can be stated as
W = f(z) + v - u*, (4)
where W is again the observed wage, z is a vector of all wage determining variables
representing human capital stock, job characteristics and regional labor market
conditions, v is a symmetric error, and u* is a nonnegative error. In addition,
W* = f(z) + v. (5)
This model has the same general form as the stochastic frontier production function
E(W/W( ) ' (1/N)j
N
i'1




of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and is similar to the earnings frontiers
developed by Herzog, Hofler and Schlottmann (1985), Hofler and Murphy (1992),
Hofler and Polachek (1985), and Polachek and Yoon (1987). Based upon equations
(4) and (5), notice that W/W* = 1 -(u*/W*) =1 - u. In addition, note that: (1) u =
0 when W = W*, (2) u > 0 when W < W*, and (3) u varies across individuals as
W/W* varies. Finally, because the nonnegative error term satisfies these three
characteristics, it is asserted that u* in equation (4) captures the effect of
underemployment. Thus, this wage frontier, equation (4), is the explicit equivalent
of equation (3).
For any N individuals within a given country and/or occupational group
(professional and technical, other white collar, or blue collar and service), 
(6)
When equation (4) is defined in semilogarithmic form and -u is exponentially
distributed, equation (6) can be expressed as
E(W/W*) = E[exp(-u)] = 1/(1 + µ ), (7)u
where µ  is the mean of u. Comparisons of mean levels of underemployment betweenu
countries and/or among occupational groups can then be made on the basis of
equation (7).
IV.  Econometric results
A. Data
A comparative empirical examination of the outcome of the job search process
(described above) is made possible by the availability, and consistency, of survey
data in the two nations. The Dutch OSA survey [Vissers et al. (1986)] provides labor
     The research population for the United States comprises individuals within the sample as of12
April, 1985 (Wave 6), and allows linked records back to September, 1983 (Wave 1).  The Dutch
OSA Survey asked individuals for retrospective information as of January, 1980.
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force data for a national sample obtained in April, 1985, and is the most adequate file
of its type in the Netherlands containing wage information. Individual records of the
Dutch survey provide information on such characteristics as weekly wages, sex, age,
education, occupation and industry.
Although alternative micro-data sources were available for the United States,
this study utilizes individual records obtained from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation [Nelson, McMillen, and Kasprzyk (1985); U.S. Department
of Commerce (1986)]. This Survey (SIPP) is the only major U.S. data source which
permits wage comparisons with Dutch individuals as of April, 1985 for a large
number of observations, and for personal characteristics defined consistently between
the two countries.12
The hypotheses formulated at the end of Section II are expected to hold both
for males and females, though not to the same degree. An important reason for
differences in degree of underemployment by sex is discrimination (Haagsma, 1995).
This implies that estimation on the basis of a pooled dataset for males and females
would be incorrect. Because of the relatively small number of observations on
females in the Dutch dataset the analysis is restricted to males.
The common universe for our comparative analysis was designed to
maximize labor force participation as well as sample consistency. Both samples
include white members of the civilian labor force aged 16-60, and exclude
individuals attending college, members of the armed forces, and inmates of
institutions. The self-employed, as well as part time workers, were also excluded
from the research population in order to better represent within our analysis the job
search process described in Section III-A. Based upon these restrictions, the resulting
samples consist of 1141 and 8117 observations for the Netherlands and United States,
respectively.
Table 2 provides information on the industrial and occupational structure of
the Dutch and U.S. labor force as tabulated from their respective samples. Of
particular interest to this study are variations in individual attainment of potential
earnings between the two countries, on an occupation-by-occupation basis. In this
     As discussed in note 9, the Dutch OSA survey provides baseline information as of 1980 while13
the SIPP sample begins in mid-1983.
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respect, the occupational distribution in Table 2 is essentially the same within the
Netherlands and the United States. The distribution of employment by industry is
also quite similar between the countries, although a higher proportion of workers in
the United States are employed in wholesale and retail trade.
B. Earnings Estimates
Based upon the discussion above, the natural logarithm of 1985 weekly earnings
(wage and salary income) was regressed against sets of variables representing both
personal and region characteristics, as well as industry affiliation. Personal
characteristics [H in equation (3)] include age (and age squared), years of education
and household relationships (family size and marital status). Marital status is
represented by a binary variable set equal to unity for individuals who are single. In
addition, given the importance of job transfers for white-collar workers [Schlottmann
and Herzog (1984)], a binary variable (mover) was set equal to unity for 1980-1985
interprovince migration in the Netherlands, or 1983-1985 interstate migration in the
United States.  Finally, a variable denoting number of weeks an individual reported13
looking for work or on layoff within the above intervals was included as a measure
of work interruption (and reduced experience as well as (perceived) lower
productivity).
18
Table 2. Mean Industry-Occupation Characteristics of the Labor
Force By Country (Proportion)a
Characteristic Netherlands United States
Industryb
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries .01 .04
Construction .11 .10
Manufacturing .23 .27
Transportation, Communication, and Public .10 .09
Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade .16 .20
Commercial Services and Public .38 .30
Administration
Occupationc
Blue Collar and Service .50 .52
Professional and Technical .29 .27
Other White Collar .22 .21
For a definition of the research population, see the text. Sample observations for the Netherlandsa
and the United States are 1141 and 8117 respectively. Characteristics are reported as of April, 1985.
Industry classification is at the three-digit level. This classification was based on the closely matchedb
SBI (Standard Bedrijfsindeling) used by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics and the U.S. Standard
Industrial Classification System.
Occupational groups are matched at the three-digit level. The Central Bureau of Statistics OSA andc
Census Occupational Classification System codes were utilized for the Dutch and U.S. data,
respectively.
µ2u
     See Schmidt and Lovell (1979) and Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) for a14
discussion of the frontier estimation technique.  Polachek and Yoon (1987) and Herzog, Hofler,
and Schlottmann (1985) have also obtained consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of
earnings frontiers by maximum likelihood techniques.
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Regional characteristics [R in equation (3)] were included within the analysis to
adjust for intracountry differences in local labor market conditions. For the
Netherlands, a single variable was set to unity (vs. zero) to reflect higher relative
unemployment in peripheral (nonmetropolitan) areas. Two binary variables were
employed within the U.S. regressions, and were designed to obtain consistency with
the Dutch data. These latter variables were set to unity (and zero otherwise) for
individuals residing in nonmetropolitan areas and/or in states with above average
unemployment rates.
Finally, job characteristics [J in equation (3)] relate to duties performed
while at work, and are represented within the earnings analysis by a regime of
dummy variables. With the exception of manufacturing (the omitted category), these
industries correspond to those considered in Table 2.
Separate earnings frontiers were estimated for the Netherlands and the United States
by maximum likelihood techniques. This procedure provides consistent estimates of
all parameters, after which the two-component error term, v-u in equation (4), can
be decomposed into separate estimates of v and u.  In this regard it was assumed that14
v and u in equation (4) are independent, that v is normally distributed with a zero
mean and finite variance, and that u is derived from an exponential distribution with
mean µ  and variance u .
Straightforward estimation of equation (4) is not possible because of sample
selection bias. This kind of bias is relevant here because W is observed only for those
who are working. Individuals who are not working were dropped from the sample
on which the wage equation is estimated. As shown by Heckman (1979)
straightforward estimation of a relationship (ie the wage equation) without correcting
for the deletion of observations confounds the parameters of interest with parameters
of the function specifying the probability of being in the sample.
The problem of selectivity will be handled here by the application of the
procedure advocated by Heckman (1979). In the present situation it comes down to
probit estimation of an employment model on the basis of the sample for each
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country including both employed and unemployed. The probit model gives the
probability to be employed at the date of the interview and hence to earn a wage.
From this model the inverse of Mill's ratio is estimated. The inverse of Mill's ratio
is used as a regressor in the wage equation estimated on a subsample consisting of the
individuals who were employed at the date of the interview.
The use of the estimated Mill's ratio introduces a stochastic regressor in the
likelihood function. This means that the standard errors must be corrected since the
standard procedure for estimating standard errors understates the true standard
errors. The correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is given by Heckman
(1979). In the case the null hypothesis of no selection bias holds the usual standard
errors are appropriate. This hypothesis can be tested by means of the t-distribution
(Heckman, 1979). The employment models are given in Appendix 1. The estimated
models are in line with various empirical models such as Devine and Kiefer (1991)
and Van Dijk and Folmer (1985). The inverse of Mill's ratio obtained for the total
sample was used in the wage equations for both the total sample and the occupational
subsamples.
Earnings frontier coefficient estimates are provided in Tables 3 - 4 for the
Netherlands and United States, respectively. In both tables, estimates shown in the
first column were obtained for the entire sample, and will later be employed to
address the first of the two hypotheses developed in Section II. In these aggregate
equations, major occupation groups are represented by dummy variables (blue collar
and service workers comprising the omitted category). The latter three columns of
each table provide earnings estimates by occupation, and will subsequently be
utilized to investigate how underemployment likely varies within each country by job
search methods and other labor market institutions (the second hypothesis).
We now turn to the estimation results in Tables 3 and 4. At the outset we
observe that because of the larger number of observations the estimates for the US
tend to be more significant than for the Netherlands. The overall fit of the models is
quite good according to the log likelihood values and pseudo R s.2
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Table 3. 1985 Earnings Estimates for males: The Netherlandsa
(Dependent Variable is Ln Weekly Earnings)
By Occupation:
Variables Sample and Service and Technical White Collar
Total Blue Collar Professional Other
Constant 5.08*** 5.42*** 4.21*** 4.87***
Personal Characteristics:
Age .04*** .03*** .08*** .05***
Age Squared -.41*** -.032*** -.81*** -.52***
Education .02*** .01** .03*** .02***
Single -.07 -.06 -.09 -.02***
Family Size .01 .00 .01 .02*
Mover .06*** .06*** .04* .06**




(Nonmetro, High -.03* -.01 -.03 -.03
Unemployment)
Industry:
Agriculture, Forestry, -.12* -.08 -.10 -.11
and Fisheries
Construction .02 .02 .09 .09
Transportation,  
Communication and .00 .04 .01   -.02
Public Utilities
Wholesale and Retail -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02
Trade
Commercial Services





Other White Collar .06***
Mill's ratio -.12 -.19 -.25  -.30
N 1141 565 329 247
Loglikelihood 311 217 52 108
Pseudo  R .48 .27 .39 .46b 2
22
  * two-sided t-test significant at the .10 level.
 ** two-sided t-test significant at the .05 level.
*** two-sided t-test significant at the .01 level.
 All variables as well as the estimation technique are defined in the text.a
 Defined as the squared correlation between the observed and predicted dependent variable.b
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Table 4. 1985 Earnings Estimates for Males:  The United Statesa
(Dependent Variable is Ln Weekly Earnings)
By Occupation:
Variables Sample and Service and Technical White Collar
Total Blue Collar Professional Other
Constant  2.50*** 3.66*** 2.50*** 2.23***
Personal Characteristics:
Age .14*** .12*** .13*** .17***
Age Squared -1.44*** -1.29*** -1.26*** -1.89***
Education .05*** .02*** .05*** .04***
Single -.47*** -.29*** -.35*** .41***
Family Size -.01** -.03*** .03** -.06***
Mover .18*** .04 .22*** .41***
Weeks Looking for -.01*** -.01*** -.02*** -.02***
Work/Layoff
Regional Characteristics:
Nonmetro -.13*** -.07** -.23*** -.11***
High Local -.01 -.01 -.03 .01
Unemployment Rate
Industry:
Agriculture, Forestry, and -.22*** -.30** -.01 .02
Fisheries
Construction -.01 -.00 -.17** .23
Transportation,
Communication and Public.05* -.12*** -.04 .07
Utilities
Wholesale and Retail -.23*** -.35*** -.17*** .02
Trade
Commercial Services and
Public Administration -.26*** -.32*** -.20*** -.11*
Occupation:
Professional and Technical .27***
Other White Collar .08***
Mill's ratio  2.08*** .68 2.40*** .96
N 8117 4216 2202 1699
Loglikelihood -7585 -3578 -1943 -1833
Pseudo  R .42 .40 .28 .44b 2
  *t-test significant at the .10 level.
 **t-test significant at the .05 level.
***t-test significant at the .01 level.
 All variables as well as the estimation technique are defined in the text.a
 For a definition see Table 3.b
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The coefficients for the Mill's ratios are insignificant for the Netherlands. For the US
the Mill's ratio is significant for the total sample and the professional and technical
workers. The standard errors have been corrected as indicated above. The constant
term in the US is substantially lower than in the Netherlands (except for other white
collar workers) while the impacts of the personal characteristics are substantially
larger. Although part of the difference reflects differences in the exchange rates, this
also shows that wages in the US are more dependent on personal characteristics
which is indicative of the influence of institutional factors, in particular wage
bargaining (see also Hartog et al, 1997).
Weekly earnings are augmented by additional years of education and age
(albeit at a declining rate for the latter, especially in the US), as well as by
geographic mobility. The insignificant effect of migration for blue collar workers in
the US is indicative of the deficiency of the information system for this category.
Earnings are depressed among single individuals, and members of the labor force
with interruptions to work experience. Although for the Netherlands not all
coefficients are significant, their signs are according to expectations. Family size has
a negative impact in the US while a positive, though insignificant, effect in the
Netherlands. Turning to regional characteristics, peripheral (nonmetropolitan)
locations diminish earnings in both countries, especially in the United States. In the
Netherlands the impact is only significant for the total sample. Also, for the United
States, earnings within agriculture, forestry, fisheries, wholesale and retail trade,
commercial services, and public administration are in most cases below those in
manufacturing, ceteris paribus. 
In the Netherlands only few significant sectoral impacts can be discerned.
Most striking is the positive impact for blue collar workers in commercial services
and public administration. Finally, estimates in the first column of each table
indicate, for equivalent H, J and R in equation (3), how earnings vary by occupation.
In both countries earnings of professionals and white collar workers are higher than
those of blue collar workers (reference group).
     These errors were derived from an expression developed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and15
Schmidt (1982).  Their method employs the conditional distribution of µ [given the estimable
total error (v-µ)] to obtain information about µ.
     Equality of W/W* between the two countries is rejected at the 1 percent level.  In this regard,16
see the notes below Table 5.
     For the United States, alternative estimates to those reported in Tables 4 and 5 were obtained17
for individuals residing within certain Northeastern states in 1985 (Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania). These estimates, for a geographic region
that better approximates the transportation network and population distribution characteristics
of the Netherlands, are essentially the same as those reported.
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C. Underemployment
Given the earnings estimates in Tables 3 and 4, nonnegative errors (u) for
individuals within each country and model can be determined by equation (4).15
Equation (7) can then be employed to estimate E(W/W*), the mean ratio of actual to
potential earnings for members of the Dutch and U.S. labor force. These calculations
are presented in Table 5. As discussed above, better labor market information and/or
other more generous labor market institutions increase this ratio and, in turn,
decrease underemployment. Thus, for any model (total sample or major occupational
group), differences in the mean level of underemployment between the countries can
be imputed based upon statistically significant differences in E(W/W*).
Given estimates for the total samples in Table 5, Dutch and American males
achieve, on average, 91.7 and 68.1 percent of their potential 1985 earnings,
respectively. A t-test indicates that the above rates for the Netherlands significantly
exceed those for the United States.  Thus, evidence is provided in support of the16
first hypothesis, namely that underemployment among Dutch workers is significantly
less than that among American workers.
Mean W/W* were also estimated on the basis of the occupation-specific
earnings equations in Tables 3 and 4. These ratios are listed in Table 5 where
significant pair-wise differences between countries (columns) are also noted.17
Moreover, significant pair-wise differences within countries were found, although
of much smaller magnitude than the between-country differences. These results
suggest that, although differential information channels are important between
occupations, the institutional differences discussed above play a crucial role. In
general, the results in Table 5 confirm the research hypotheses presented above.
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Table 5. Estimates of Mean 1985 W/W*
 by Occupation and Country (Percent)a
Occupation Netherlands United Statesb c c
Blue Collar and Service 91.9 68.7
Professional and Technical 93.3 70.1
Other White Collar 96.0 65.3
Total 91.7 68.1
          Estimates were obtained from the earnings equations shown in Tables 3 and 4. Seea
equation (7) in Section III-B.
          The null hypothesis that mean W/W* for an occupation in the Netherlands is equal tob
the corresponding mean in the U.S. was tested by t-statistic. The alternative hypothesis
is that these means are not equal. Based upon this test all hypothesis were rejected at the
1% level.
          Pair-wise differences within countries are significant at the 5% level or less, except forc
blue collar and services and professional and technical in the Netherlands, which is
significant at the 10% level.
V.  Conclusions
In this paper the impacts on underemployment of labor market institutions within the
Netherlands and the United States have been investigated. The most important labor
market institutions which impact underemployment are information channels and job
search costs, unemployment insurance benefits, and collective bargaining.  Wage
impacts have been measured in terms of variations among workers in the attainment
of potential (or maximum attainable) earnings. Empirical research in this field within
a given national economy has been hampered because of infrequent institutional
changes and because adjustments to institutional changes are often difficult to
disentangle from other changing conditions.
In this paper a cross-nation comparison has been applied. The countries
under comparison are the US and the Netherlands. Because of the quality of
information channels, higher unemployment insurance benefits and more collective
wage bargaining it has been hypothesized that within wage regimes undifferentiated
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by occupation measured underemployment will be significantly less in the
Netherlands than in the US. Moreover, among occupational groups differences in
underemployment have also been hypothesized both within and between the two
countries, primarily because of differences in the availability and use of information
channels. 
Wage frontier models have been applied to measure underemployment. The
estimated models for the US and the Netherlands show strong similarities in terms
of personal attributes assumed to augment human capital stock (such as age,
education, duration of unemployment and marital status), regional characteristics
(metropolitan vs non-metropolitan areas) and occupation (blue collar and service,
professional and technical and other white collar workers). The main differences
between the two countries relate to industry. For the US earnings within sectors such
as wholesale and retail trade are consistently below earnings in manufacturing. In the
Netherlands only three significant sectoral impacts can be discerned. Most important
is the positive impact for blue collar workers in commercial services and public
administration.
The empirical findings with respect to underemployment support the
hypotheses. In the Netherlands the ratio of the observed wage to the potential wage
ranges from 92% for blue collar and service workers to 96% for other white collar
workers. In the US the observed ratios are consistently lower, with the lowest ratio
for other white collar workers (65%) and the highest for professional and technical
workers (70%).
In summary, labor market institutions appear to lead to substantially less
underemployment in the Netherlands than in the US. From the smaller within
country differences observed between occupational groups, the results suggest that
information channels play much less of a role than the other institutional aspects.
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Appendix A. Employment models
The employment models are based on inter alia Kiefer and Neumann (1989) and Van
Dijk and Folmer (1985). The probability of being employed and hence earning a
wage is assumed to be a function of age, education, marital status, family size and
location of residence in the core or the periphery in the Netherlands and a
metropolitan or non-metropolitan region in the U.S.
Table A.1 Employment models probit estimates
Netherlands United States
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant 1.33  2.97  .36  3.81
Age -.01 -1.14  .01   5.59
Education  .08  4.55  .04 14.57
Single -.81  -.81 -.39 -8.95
Family size -.06  -.07  .04  2.58
Periphery -.37  -.37 -.08 -2.28
N 1247  9196
Loglikelihood -325 -3068
% correctly    91%     88%
   predicted
